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ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF DOES LITTLE MORE THAN ARGUE 
AROUND THE ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THIS CASE. 
Petitioner, in its brief, acknowledged the doctrine of 
"implied authorityff which is nothing but actual authority 
circumstantially proved.1 See Brief of Petitioner at 5-6. 
Respondents rely, once again, on the testimony of their auditor 
that is quoted verbatim in the Brief of Petitioner, at 6, as 
follows: 
Q. And your statement on the previous 
document, dealing with the sample method 
projection— . . . —my question was, was, 
at any given time, did she have to request 
authorization to approve a document to be 
signed [sic] or get requests— 
A. Well, sometimes she wouldn't have 
information or if she thought it was 
something that Mr. Draper needed to get 
involved with, she would make that 
statement, that I—I need to talk to Tim 
Draper. 
Transcript at 36:19-25. The Respondents cannot rely simply on 
Ms. Fanger's statements for their position, however. In City 
Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth. 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court made clear: 
one who deals exclusively with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite 
the agent's representations. 
l0nce again, Petitioner notes that "apparent authority" 
has never been raised as a basis to support any finding and 
apparently has been waived. 
1 
Here, Respondents admit they took no steps to ascertain 
Ms. Fanger's authority, but instead "assumed" she had 
authority. Beyond that, all of Respondents' arguments 
attempting to show implied authority in Ms. Fanger to waive 
Petitionees limitations defense appear to center around the 
mere fact that Ms. Fanger held the position of accounting 
manager. 
Respondents1 argument is, of course, in keeping with their 
policy of not seeking out authorized officers of corporations 
to sign limitations waivers. The impropriety of this general 
policy is argued by Petitioner in the Brief of Petitioner at 4-
9 and will not be repeated here. 
Respondents attempt to avoid discussing this clearly 
questionable policy by arguing: 
Petitioner broadly characterizes the authority its 
accounting manager exercised as "authority to waive 
legal defenses of the corporation." Petitioner's 
brief at 8. Notwithstanding, this authority is more 
accurately described as simply the authority of an 
accounting manager to oversee and facilitate a tax 
audit. 
Brief of Respondent at 9. This argument with Petitioner's 
characterization of the issue does not change the fact that 
Respondents seek support for a finding of authority to waive a 
legal defense of the corporation. The fact that Ms. Fanger was 
helping the auditor to locate documents of the corporation 
cannot, of itself, be a basis for an inference that the waiver 
2 
of the legal defense of statute of limitations is "incidental 
to, . . . necessary, usual, [or] proper to accomplish or 
perform" the acts of providing of the auditor with such 
documents. 
Simply put, there is no circumstantial evidence showing 
that Ms. Fanger would have authority to waive the statute of 
limitations defense. As such, the uncontradicted testimony of 
Timothy Draper, that she did not have that authority, must be 
accepted as true and the Respondents' decision reversed. The 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence is simply not adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion that Ms. 
Fanger had such authority. See Boston First Nat'l. v. Salt 
Lake City Bd.. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the 
Brief of Petitioner, the decision of the Commission should be 
reversed as to the conclusion that Ms. Fanger was authorized to 
execute a limitations defense waiver and the matter should be 
remanded to the Commission with directions to exclude from its 
determination of tax owing any sums barred by the limitations 
period. 
3 
DATED this 7th day of November, 1991. 
LLLISTERV DUNCAN &/ tfEBEKER 
--^David W. Scofield 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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